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The DOJ’s Tools to Combat the Opioid Crisis: Do They Work?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. THE OPIOID CRISIS
The United States is confronted by an enormous public health crisis relating to
prescription opioid drugs. Although the total number of drug overdose deaths decreased by four
percent from 2017 to 2018, the number of drug overdose deaths was still four times higher in
2018 than in 1999 with the death toll over 67,000 in the United States alone.1 Of that,
prescription opioids were involved in 32% of all opioid deaths in 2018.2 Abuse of prescription
opioid pain medications has become a substantial public health epidemic throughout the nation.3
Prescriptions opioids are found on the streets in the United States more than any other developed
nation.4 An estimated 2.5 million Americans have an opioid use disorder and the epidemic
continues to grow.5
This article will examine how federal law enforcement has responded to the opioid
epidemic through a variety of legal tools. This article will focus on several initiatives including
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) prosecutions under the False Claims Act (FCA), the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), and the newly
enacted Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 (EKRA). Seeing that this epidemic is
complex, this article will focus specifically on one underlying cause: the over-prescription of
opioids and, in particular, the gaps in federal regulations that present issues in enforcement as
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well as regulation of prescription opioids. Furthermore, this article will examine EKRA, a newlyenacted law intended to combat entities who specifically take advantage of those who are
suffering with addiction. This examination will show that different legal tools are most
appropriate to deal with issues at various places along the prescription drug supply chain.
a. Causes of the Opioid Crisis
Because the opioid crisis is complex and multifaceted, it is important to note the various
players in the system and how prescription drugs enter the market and reach users. Drug
manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, doctors, patients, and dealers each have a unique and
significant role in the narrative of the current opioid crisis. The narrative often begins with
pharmaceutical manufacturers who research, develop and promote the drug for particular uses.6
Pharmaceutical distributors purchase prescription medicines and other medical products directly
from the manufacturer for storage in warehouses and distribution centers across the country.7
Distributors then deliver the drugs to state-regulated pharmacies, hospitals and other drug
retailers.8 For a patient to then get the medicine from a hospital or pharmacy, it must start with a
prescription. Physicians make the clinical decisions as to who should or should not receive a
medicine or what medicine is best for a particular patient. Along this supply chain, there are
various opportunities for the drugs to be abused and diverted into illegal channels and used for
non-medical uses.9
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Opioid prescriptions in the United States quadrupled between 1999 and 2018.
Epidemiologists view the progression of opioid use in three waves.10 The first wave began in
1999 (which is why it is typically used as a starting point in most statistics) when there was an
initial rise in prescription opioid overdose deaths.11 The second wave started in 2010 when a very
stark rise in heroin overdose deaths occurred.12 The third wave arrived soon after in 2013 where
another stark rise in overdose deaths occurred at the hands of synthetic opioids, particularly those
involving illicitly manufactured fentanyl.13 The National Institute of Drug Abuse reported that
this was the sharpest increase with more than 28,400 overdose deaths in 2017.14 These official
mortality figures are likely undercounted, since the data do not include those who were revived
by Narcan (an overdose reversing drug), but had already suffered brain injury due to lack of
oxygen.15 Many users die weeks later of pneumonia or other overdose-induced complications.16
While this article will focus more narrowly on the particular legal context that presents an
opportunity to help alleviate the opioid crisis, it is important to recognize some of the broader
forces that may also contribute to the epidemic. There are several causes to the opioid epidemic
such as the reliance of pharmacotherapy treatments17 and the limited access to drug treatment
through Medicate and other insurance coverage, 18 but this is not the focus of this paper. Instead,
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this paper will focus on arguably the main underlying cause of the opioid epidemic – the overprescription of drugs. 19
American doctors prescribe three times more opioids than European doctors.20 Opioid
prescriptions have increased by more than 300 percent since 1999 while doctors prescribed about
three hundred million opioids in 2015 alone.21 When physicians prescribe an overabundance of
opioids, abuse and overreliance become more likely and will eventually pose a danger to the
overall public health. Studies have shown that “approximately half of opioid prescriptions are for
indications and durations for which evidence of effectiveness is weak or nonexistent….”22 If this
is the case, it seems likely that the risk of abuse and reliance would outweigh the benefits of a the
short-term opioid pain treatment. Prescription opioids can lead to addiction, produce negative
mental and physical side effects, and are no more effective than non-opioid painkillers at treating
many long and short-term issues.23 While many prescription opioids do help people suffering
from pain, experts have underestimated the potential for opioid misuse and addiction. A solution
does not call for a complete elimination of prescription opioids, but rather, the elimination of
inappropriate prescriptions, allocating funding for treatments that utilize counseling, and
conducting further research to alternative treatments and into the conditions that give rise to
chronic physical and mental pain.24
A subsequent issue to the overabundance of prescription opioids is the overpayment by
government in health care expenditure. An overabundance has cost the government billions of
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dollars in health care spending in false claims, criminal activity and decreased economic
productivity of people with opioid use disorders.25 Additionally, the government loses money
when it pays for prescription claims that, if it knew were false, it would not have reimbursed the
prescription. This article will focus next on the DOJ’s response of the opioid epidemic through
various legal remedies including the False Claims Act (FCA), which directly addresses the issue
noted above.
II.

DOJ’s INIATIVES
In 2016, the DOJ dedicated its United States Attorneys’ Bulletin to “Addressing the

Heroin and Opioid Crisis.”26 In the bulletin, then-Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Quillian
Yates emphasized the importance that any solution by the federal government “must be
holistic”.27 This included the cooperation of several agencies such as the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, and the Bureau of
Justice Assistance’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Grant Programs.28 The Trump administration
maintained the opioid-related initiatives announced by Yates when President Trump declared the
opioid crisis a nationwide “public health emergency.”29
In addition to combatting drugs on the street, the DOJ took further measures to bring
legal actions based on the investigation efforts of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Health Care Fraud Prevention Team, and Medicare Fraud Strike Force. The
Medicare Fraud Strike Force Teams in particular brings together efforts of the Office of the
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Inspector General (OIG), DOJ, and FBI to successfully investigate and identify fraud relating to
health care.30
One of the earliest and most notable enforcement efforts by the OIG was in 2007 during
the investigation of Purdue Pharma – the company that manufactures the narcotic painkiller
OxyContin. Purdue and three executives pled guilty “to criminal charges that they misled
regulators, doctors and patients about the drug’s risk of addition and its potential to be abused.”31
Because of the DOJ’s authority to bring both civil and criminal charges, the company agreed to
pay over $600 million in fines and the executives a total of $34.6 million.32 Experts believe that
the power opioid painkiller strength and addictive potential contributed to the current opioid
epidemic, which may be why it was the largest settlement paid by a pharmaceutical manufacturer
at the time.33 The DOJ continues to pursue these civil and criminal actions against fraudulent
medical practices in a fight to combat the growth of the opioid epidemic.34 The DOJ’s legal tools
and initiatives have displayed their effectiveness in prosecuting bad actors in the health care
supply chain. However, this article will reveal several gaps in the laws that federal prosecutors
rely on in prosecuting those who are exploiting the crisis.
A. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
a. Background of the FCA
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The first relevant law that this article will address in the attempt to combat the opioid
crisis is the FCA. The FCA is arguably among the most powerful weapons the government has in
its arsenal to combat healthcare fraud and abuse.35 The FCA was initially passed to impose civil
liability for fraudulent claims submitted to the government. Eventually the practice of using
private citizens to sue on behalf of the government proved to be an efficient law enforcement
strategy.36 FCA prosecutions permitted the government to seek treble damages and use the qui
tam, or whistleblower, provision to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward with allegations
of fraud.37 A large portion of FCA recovery has come from settlements from health care
companies.38
The False Claims Act imposes civil liabilities for violations that occur when an
individual: (1) “knowingly presents or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval” to the federal government, including a false Medicare or Medicaid claim;
(2) “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement material to
a false or fraudulent claim.”39 Examples of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal claims that
violate the FCA include claims for health care services not actually provided, claims that
misrepresent the level of health care services that were provided, and claims for unnecessary
health services.40 Knowing conduct includes conduct involving actual knowledge of a falsehood

Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government’s Mistaken Use of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in
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as well as conduct involving deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth.41 The act
does not require specific intent to defraud.42
FCA claims may be classified as factually false or legally false. Factually false claims
include claims that are false on their face, such as claims for nonexistent care provided to
fictitious patients or claims supported by falsified medical records.43 Legally false claims, at first
glance, may appear to be facially, technically accurate in the sense that a provider may have seen
a patient in the office, however it becomes legally false because a provider may have failed to
meet a regulation in connection to the office visit.44 Legally false claims may be further divided
into express false certifications and implied false certifications, depending on the type of
certification made (or not) on the claim or invoice.45 Express false certifications occur when a
claimant makes an “explicitly false certification of compliance with an underlying program
condition, such as by signing a false certification statement” on a claim.46 In the absence of such
express certifications, an implied false certification occurs when a claimant submits a
reimbursement claim without disclosing that the claimant is in violation of a legal requirement
that affects the claimant’s eligibility.47
In 2016 the Supreme Court addressed the circuit split regarding whether the government
could use an implied false certification as a basis for a FCA violation in Universal Health
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Services Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar.48 The Court held that the implied certification
theory can serve as a basis for FCA liability.49 When a claim is submitted to the government,
there is an implied certification that all material laws and regulations have been complied with.50
If a noncompliant claim has been submitted, it would then materially influence the government’s
decision to pay and thus the FCA would be implicated.51 It is important to also note that the FCA
violation is undermined when the law being violated is not material to the government’s decision
to pay.52 The FCA’s application hinges off of the statute’s materiality element. Whether or not a
claim is considered “false”, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, depends on whether the
government would have paid for the claim.53 The Act defines “material” as having a natural
tendency to influence or is capable of influencing payment.54
Under the FCA’s qui tam provisions, a private person, known as “relator,” may enforce
the statute by filing a complaint, under seal, setting forth allegations of fraud committed against
the government.55 The government will then investigate these allegations and the DOJ can
intervene in the action and lift the seal from the complaint assuming the primary responsibility
for prosecuting the claim.56 The FCA is popular among fraud prosecutions because if the
government prevails on the merits, it is awarded treble damages plus penalties for each false
claim. 57 In addition, the relator or whistleblower may recover 15 to 25% of the government’s
recovery, plus legal fees and expenses.58 For the FCA to attach to criminal penalties, the
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fraudulent claim submitted must also implicate a federal criminal statute such as the Antikickback statute, which will be discussed later in this article.59
b. Applying the FCA in the Context of Opioids
False claims submitted to the government are a key gateway for prescription opioids that
are not medically indicated to enter the community.60 Although Universal Health Services,
received significant attention in regards to the legally false certification theory of FCA liability,
health industry participants that prescribe or dispense opioids violate more traditional provisions
within the FCA.61 Prescription opioids, when not medically indicated, enter the streets when a
physician prescribes opioids that are not considered a “medical necessity” implicating a factually
false claim.62 Medicare and Medicaid programs only provide payment for those healthcare
services that are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.”63
The FCA is violated when it can be proven that the defendant submitted a claim for an
item or service when the defendant knew those items and services were not medically necessary
or where the defendant knowingly falsified medical records to make a medically unnecessary
item or service appear necessary.64 For example, if a physician knowingly lies to the
government about the medical necessity or did not properly document what is medically
necessary when submitting a claim, the FCA is implicated.65
In January 2018, Matthew Anderson, a chiropractor who worked in Tennessee, agreed to
pay $1.45 million plus interest to resolve FCA violations and contributing to the state’s opioid

59
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epidemic.66 The government alleged that the defendant and his management company instructed
employees of his four clinics to up-code office visits by assigning an inaccurate billing code
increase Medicare reimbursement.67 As a result Anderson caused pharmacies to submit requests
for Medicare payments for pain killers, including opioids, which were dispensed based upon the
defendant’s prescriptions 68 “Pill mills” such as this billed medically unnecessary services to
Medicare, defrauded the government and contributed to opioid abuse and addiction. Fortunately,
the FCA creates liability not just for those who submitted false claims, but also for those who
“cause” false reimbursement claims to be made or “cause” false statements to be made in
connection with claims for reimbursement.69
However, “expressions of opinion, scientific judgements , or statements as to conclusions
about which reasonable minds may differ” cannot be actionable.70 Courts are also in agreement
that mistaken or negligent certifications or statements regarding medical necessity are not
actionable.71 However, when a physician prescribes an unnecessary drug, it directly contributes
to the overabundance of opioids in the hands of who may not need them, effectively enabling
prescription opioid use disorders.72
The medical necessity requirement serves one of the FCA’s limitations in enforcement
and prosecution. Courts have been hesitant when invaliding a physician’s scientific or medical
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judgment in fear of undermining their profession.73 Instead, courts have consistently declined to
find that a contractor’s exercise of scientific or professional judgment as to an applicable
standard of care falls within the scope of the FCA.74 A scientific dispute on what is “medically
necessary” for a patient is not always a fraud case and reasonable disagreements in the medical
or scientific methodology simply do not give rise to FCA liability.75 As stated above, in order
invoke FCA liability in this context, it must be proven that a defendant submitted a claim for
government reimbursement that was medically unnecessary, such as the defendant in Tennessee
noted above. This limitation may allow for physicians and doctors to hide behind the cloak of
their medical opinions, expressions, and scientific work to justify their fraudulent claims.
B. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT
a. Background of the CSA
This article will now shift to its second focus: The Controlled Substance Act and its
effectiveness in combatting the opioid epidemic. The primary federal law governing the
manufacture, distribution, and use of prescription and illicit opioids is the Controlled Substance
Act (CSA).76 The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a law enforcement agency within the DOJ,
is principally responsible for administering and enforcing the CSA.77 The CSA provides a
framework through which the federal government regulates the manufacture, distribution,
importation, exportation, and use of certain substances which have the potential for abuse or
psychological or physical dependence, including both illicit and prescription opioids.78
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The CSA classifies various plants, drugs, chemicals into one of five schedules based on
the substances’ medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability.79 Schedule I
contains substances, such as the hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide, better known as LSD,
and the illicit opioid heroin, that have “a high potential for abuse” with “no currently accepted
medical use in the treatment in the U.S.” and that cannot safely be dispensed under a
prescription.80 Schedules II, III, IV, and V include substances that have recognized medical uses,
such as prescription opioids like oxycodone, codeine, and morphine, and may be manufactured,
distributed, prescribed, dispensed, and possessed in accordance to the CSA.81
The CSA also details who must register with the DEA in order to receive authorization to
handle the substances.82 These “registrants” include manufacturers, distributors, doctors,
hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers.83 This creates a “closed system” of lawful
distribution among registered handlers of controlled substances. In addition to this, the CSA
requires that the DEA establish a quota system that restricts the total amount of certain controlled
substances that may be annually produced or manufactured.84 The DEA establishes quotas for
the maximum amount of each basic class of Schedule I and II controlled substances that can be
produced each year as well as quotas for individual manufacturers who must apply to obtain
quotas for specific classes of controlled substances.85 This essentially controls the amount of
controlled substances that can be put into the market and avoiding the overproduction of
controlled substances.

79
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Additionally, the CSA provides the legal standards through which the federal government
prevents diversion of these substances from their legitimate uses and purposes. The DEA uses
the CSA as a guide to avoid controlled substances which may have lawful uses from entering
into illicit channels.86 To track this, the CSA and its implementing regulations subject registrants
to strict requirements regarding recordkeeping, maintaining the security of inventories, and
reporting to the DEA.87 As part of the registrant’s monitoring process and to ensure compliance
with the CSA, the DEA conducts three types of investigations – regulatory, complaint , and
criminal.88 A registrant’s failure to meet the obligations set forth by the CSA can result in the
diversion of controlled substances, which, in turn, can contribute to drug abuse and addiction.89
Like most medicine, prescription opioid pain relievers are safe and effective when used
as directed, but these highly addictive substances can pose serious risks of addiction or death if
they are abused, misused, or diverted. These opportunities for abuse or diversion can occur as
drug flow through the prescription drug supply chain. 90 This supply chain is the means through
which prescription drugs are ultimately delivered to patients with legitimate medical needs. The
typical goes as followed: prescription drugs are produced by manufacturers; are purchased and
stored by distributors, who take orders and deliver them to customers such as pharmacies; and
ultimately are dispensed by pharmacies to patients who have a prescription from a practitioner.91
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Along this supply chain, there are various opportunities for the drugs to be abused and diverted
into illegal channels and used for non-medical uses. A common example of diversion is when an
individual may visit multiple practitioners posing as a legitimate patient, referred to as a “doctor
shopper,” to obtain prescriptions for drugs for themselves or others.92 In other more obvious
cases, diversion can occur when a criminal enterprise robs distributors and pharmacies of
prescription drugs to illicitly sell to others for a profit.93
b. Enforcing the CSA in the Context of Opioids
The CSA provides the DEA with a variety of criminal, civil, and administrative tools to
hold manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and physicians accountable for violations of the
CSA’s regulatory requirements.94 Registrants who fail to adhere to the CSA requirements may
face administrative consequences, civil and criminal fines, and even the possibility of
imprisonment.95
The CSA makes it an offense to “knowingly” possess a “controlled substance” with the
intent to distribute it. In McFadden v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that “the word
knowingly applies not just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those verbs – ‘a
controlled substance.’”96 In CSA cases, the federal government has the burden to prove the
element of mens rea of “knowing” beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the government
must prove that the defendant “knew” that they possessed a controlled substance.97 A violation
of the CSA’s registration requirements – including “failure to maintain records or detect and
report suspicious orders, noncompliance with security requirements, or dispensing controlled

92
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substances without the necessary prescriptions.” 98 These violations do not typically constitute a
criminal offense unless the violation is committed knowingly. In that event, the DOJ has the
authority to bring criminal charges against both individual and corporate registrants.99
Furthermore, the Act’s trafficking provisions allow for prosecution of the illegal
distribution of controlled substances. Although this may primarily involve the illegal distribution
of recreational drugs, the CSA applies to illicit activities involving pharmaceutical or nonpharmaceutical controlled substances.100 “Notably, the CSA’s registration system and its
trafficking regime are not mutually exclusive, and participation in the registration system does
not insulate registrants from the statute’s trafficking penalties.” For example, a registered
physician may be prosecuted under the CSA for illegally prescribing and distributing
prescription drugs. This provision and interpretation of the CSA has been exponential in
combatting the overabundance of prescription opioids in the community. In United States v.
Moore, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the CSA, “must be interpreted in light of a
congressional intent to set up two separate and distinct penalty systems,” one for registrants and
one for non-registrants.101 The Court held that physicians registered under the Act can be
prosecuted under the drug trafficking provision “when their activities fall outside the usual
course of professional practice.”102 In other words, when physicians are acting less like medical
doctors treating patients and more like a large-scale drug pusher.
The decision in Moore also upholds convictions of pharmacists who signed thousands of
prescriptions for sale though an online pharmacy, and a practitioner who “freely distributed
98

Congressional Research Service, supra note 9.
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100
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102
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prescriptions for large amounts of controlled substances that are highly addictive, difficult to
obtain, and sought after for nonmedical purposes…”103 However, one limitation to prosecuting
bad actors under Moore requires “more than a showing of mere professional malpractice.” For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecution must prove that the defendant “acted with
intent to distribute drugs and with intent to distribute them outside the course of professional
practice,” suggesting that intent must be established with respect to the nature of the defendant’s
failure to abide by professional norms.104
The DOJ’s prosecution of criminal trafficking charges against doctors and pharmacies
has proved essential in combatting diversion and ensuring proper regulation of the CSA. This has
also been seminal in combatting the overabundance of prescription opioids leading to addiction
and abuse. However, in April 2019, the DOJ used the CSA for the first time to bring criminal
trafficking charges against a drug distributor .105 The DOJ successfully prosecuted two
executives of Rochester Drug Cooperative (RDC) on the company’s sale of the opioids
oxycodone and fentanyl to pharmacies that illegally distributed and diverted the drugs.106 RDC
was charged with unlawfully distributing oxycodone and fentanyl, defrauding the DEA, and
failing to report suspicious order to the DEA.107 The DOJ entered into a deferred prosecution
agree and consent decree with RDC, which has admitted to its misconduct.108 In addition, the
pharmaceutical paid a substantial penalty, agreed to be supervised by a monitor and make
significant reforms to its compliance program.109
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Lastly, CSA cases may also be prosecuted alongside the FCA. Several health industry
players have settled FCA allegation predicated on violating of material statutes and regulations
such as the provisions within the CSA.110 In 2015, PharMerica Corporation agreed to pay the
government $31.5 million “to resolve a lawsuit alleging the pharmacy violated the CSA by
dispensing Schedule II controlled drugs without a valid prescription and the FCA by submitting
false claims to Medicare for improperly dispensed drugs.”111 Many of those prescriptions include
oxycodone and fentanyl, which the pharmacies dispensed without a CSA-required physician
prescription.112
The trend of criminally prosecuting pharmaceuticals under the CSA by the DOJ
continued. Similarly in July 2019, the DOJ successfully prosecuted the pharmaceutical
distributor Miami-Luken, Inc. for conspiracy to violate CSA’s trafficking provisions.113 The
threat of the CSA to all players on the drug supply chain has been effective in combatting the
overabundance and misuse of prescription opioids.114 In theory, the CSA can be used to
prosecute any player in the supply chain that is required to become a registrant with the DEA.
There have been proposals targeting the “imminent danger” requirement. Specifically the bill
would lower the threshold for what constitutes imminent danger, requiring “probable cause that
death, serious bodily harm, or abuse” will occur in the absence of an immediate suspension of
DEA registration.115 The opioid epidemic has been driven by the greed of pharmaceutical
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manufacturers, distributors, and physicians who exploit those with prescription drug abuse and
fuel the opioid epidemic.
In recent years, we have already seen several legislative proposals enacted into law to
prevent the illicit distribution of opioids. In 2016, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA) and the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) which
authorizes grants for educational programs to address the opioid crisis in areas including abuse
prevention, law enforcement, and treatment. These Acts also provided additional funding to
states combatting opioid addiction.116 However, in 2018, Congress went even further to enact the
SUPPORT Act (Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and
Treatment for Patients and Communities Act).117 This Act included amendments to the CSA to
include provisions expanding access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT), revising the
factors DEA considers when establishing opioid production quotas, and codifying the definition
of “suspicious order.”118
To further address the opioid crisis, there are several gaps in the CSA that can still be
filled. The CSA can allow for stricter requirements for registrants, specifically medical
practitioners, to certify that they will not prescribe more prescription opioids than necessary for
the treatment of short-term pain.119 The John S. McCain Opioid Addiction Prevention Act has
already been proposed to limit a prescription of no more than a seven-day supply of opioids for
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the treatment of acute pain.120 Moreover, with the growing rise of the synthetic opioid, fentanyl,
amending the CSA by reducing the amounts of fentanyl needed for a trafficking offense and
increasing penalties to offences involving the drug would lead to more bad actors facing criminal
liability.121
C. THE FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
a. Background of the AKS
The third federal law that this article will explore is the federal Anti-Kickback Statute
(AKS). This federal law prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment
of any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate), directly or indirectly, overly or
covertly, in case or in kind, in return for the referral of any individual for the furnishing of any
item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care
program, such as Medicare or Medicaid.122 The AKS also prohibits remuneration knowingly and
willfully exchanged in return for “purchasing, leasing, order or recommending purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under a federal health program.123
The goal of the AKS is premised upon the concern that health care kickbacks can lead to
corruption of professional medical decision making, patient steering, overutilization of health
care items (such as opioids), services, and supplies, increased costs to federal health care
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programs, and unfair competition among doctors and health care facilities.124 The Department of
Health and Human Services makes it clear to physicians that it may be acceptable to reward
those who refer business in some industries, but in the federal health care programs, paying for
referrals is a crime.125 In United States v. Patel, the Seventh Circuit issued an important ruling
regarding the meaning of the term “refer.”126 Although prior courts largely agreed that a
“referral” means sending patients to a certain provider, the Seventh Circuit adopted a broader
interpretation, holding that a physician makes a referral for a purposes of the AKS when he or
she makes a “certification or recertification” that care is necessary, even if the physician never
steered patients to the particular provider.127 This expansion is important because it gives
prosecutors broader range to charge physicians with an AKS violation because they did
something that allowed a patient to receive care from a provider when they otherwise would not
without the physicians referral.
An AKS violation is punishable as a felony. Individuals convicted of an AKS violation
shall be fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.128 With
respect to violations, a prosecutor must not prove actual knowledge or specific intent to commit a
violation of the AKS. Instead, the government has a lower burden and must only prove that the
individual “knowingly and willfully” intending to do something wrong.129 A violation of the
AKS can also subject a defendant to exclusion from future participation in federal health care
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programs as well as civil monetary penalties.130 The AKS covers the payers of the kickbacks –
those who offer or pay remuneration – as well as the recipients of kickbacks – those who solicit
or receive remunerations.131 Each party’s intent is a key element of their liability under the AKS.
b. Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute in the context of Opioids
The AKS is used to combat the opioid epidemic form several angles, whether it be street
level dealing by physicians or corporate greed by pharmaceutical companies. Both physicians
and non-physicians violate the Anti-Kickback Statute if they receive remuneration from
pharmaceutical companies in the exchange for opioids prescriptions. On the other hand, the AKS
is also enforced against those same companies who offer illegal remunerations to physicians for
unnecessary prescriptions and promotions.
One of the most notable health care fraud prosecutions in recent years was against Insys
Therapeutics Inc., who played a large role in increasing the over prescription of opioids across
the country. Former executives and managers of Insys Therapeutics, were charged with
conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute Law in relation to a nationwide conspiracy to
bribe medical practitioners to unnecessarily prescribe their fentanyl-based pain medication and
defraud payers of the medication, including insurers.132 These top executives of Insys paid
kickbacks and committed fraud to sell a highly potent and addictive opioid that led to abuse and
life threatening respiratory depression of many patients.133
In turn, there have been a number of cases in which physicians were convicted of
violating the AKS for receiving or accepting remunerations from pharmaceutical companies in
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turn for prescribing prescription opioids.134 For example, in November 2019, a New
Jersey/Pennsylvania doctor pled guilty to accepting bribes and kickbacks from Insys
Therapeutics, in exchange for prescribing more than 28 million micrograms of Subys, a powerful
opioid narcotic.135 Kenneth Sun, M.D, participated in a scheme to receive over $140,000 in
bribes and kickbacks from Insys in exchange of prescribing large volumes of Subys. Subys
contains fentanyl, a synthetic opioid pain reliever which is approximately 50 to 100 times more
potent than morphine.136 Sun admitted of proscribing Subys to patients for whom Subys was
medically unnecessary, not eligible for insurance reimbursement and unsafe.137 The scheme
involving both Insys and Sun disguised the bribes and kickbacks as “honoraria” for education
presentation regarding the narcotic that Sun purportedly provide to other doctors.138 These
presentations were a sham. Sun admitted that he defrauded the government by causing Medicare
to pay more than $847,000 for Subys prescriptions that were medically unnecessary, procured
through the payment of kickbacks and bribes and not eligible for Medicare reimbursement.139
Kenneth Sun is not the only doctor who has received remunerations in exchange for
prescribing Subys. In January of this year, a Manhattan doctor was sentence to nearly 5 years in
prison for accept bribes and kickbacks from Insys Therapeutics. Dr. Alexandru Burdecea began
prescribing Subys in 2015 – a drug that he previously never prescribed before – in exchange for
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bribes from Insys and became the 14th highest prescriber of the drug in the country with a net
sale of the drug of approximately $621,345 in that quarter.140 Burdecea was one of five doctors
who were convicted of participating in Insy’s “Speakers Bureau.” This scheme involved a roster
of doctors across the country who would conduct programs purported aimed at educating other
practitioners about Subys.141 However, in reality, the Speakers Bureau was used to induce
doctors who served as speakers to prescribe large amounts of the drugs and paying them in
Speakers fees.142
Physicians who receive remunerations from pharmacies or laboratories also violate the
Anti-Kickback Statute.143 In 2014, Dr. Carl Dennis Fowler, was convicted of violating the AKS
when he received remuneration from a pharmacist in exchange for opioid prescriptions.144 Dr.
Fowler wrote numerous prescriptions for OxyContin and oxycodone, without regard to whether
the drugs were medically necessary and filled to Patel Pharmacies, which were later resold on the
street market.145 In return, Dr. Fowler received kickbacks for writing the prescriptions that were
filled to Patel Pharmacies and that were billed to Medicare and Medicaid.146 Further, physicians
who also receive remunerations in return for referring government program patients to particular
laboratories for opioid and other drug testing services implicate the AKS.147 In 2017, a
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Pennsylvania doctor was sentenced to 84 months in prison and $2.3 million in restitution for
referring his Medicare and Medicaid patients to a lab in which he was in a joint venture with.148
Under the AKS, the fraudulent use of government money matters. Similar to the FCA,
the Act is concerned with defrauding federal health programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.
Under the AKS, even if a service is given by the physician or laboratory, a falsity still exists
because it is tainted by a kickback at the cost of federal health care programs. However, the
requisite that there a federal health care program must be involved and the defrauding of
government money must occur may also be limitation to AKS prosecutions. This limitation and a
possible remedy will be explored in the next section discussing the enactment of EKRA.
D. THE ELIMINATING KICKBACKS IN RECOVERY ACT
a. Background of EKRA
The federal government has enacted a massive new initiative to address the nation’s
opioid crisis and health care fraud that accompanies it. President Trump signed into law the
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act in 2018, which is a comprehensive legislative
initiative comprised of 70 individual bills intended to address the opioid crisis and substance
abuse.149 The SUPPORT Act appropriates millions of dollars from the Treasury and federal
Supplementary Medial Insurance Trust Fund to support federal agencies in their initiatives to
combat the opioid epidemic.150 This next section will focus specifically on Sections 8121 and
8122 part of the SUPPORT Act that establishes the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of
2018 (EKRA). Of the many consequential provisions, EKRA is one that could have a significant
impact on those involved in addiction recovery efforts and treatment facilities. Section 8122 now
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makes it a federal crime to pay for referrals to recovery homes, clinical treatment facilities and
laboratories.151 Violations would be punishable with criminal penalties such as monetary fines,
imprisonment, or both
The Eliminating Kickback in Recovery Act is designed to build on the prohibitions set
forth in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. EKRA prohibits anyone from knowingly and
willfully: (1) soliciting or receiving any remuneration in return for referring a patient to a
recovery home, clinical treatment or laboratory; or (2) paying or offering an remuneration to: (1)
induce a referral of an individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory in
exchange for an individual using the services of the recovery home, clinical treatment facility or
laboratory.152 In other words, EKRA is narrower in this sense as it only applies to referrals of
certain types of facilities, namely recovery homes, clinical treatment facilities, and laboratories.
EKRA does not preempt the Federal AKS or state law on the subject matter. So, in terms of
practicality, ERKA cannot be used when the AKS applies.153
EKRA addresses Congress’s growing concerns about patient brokering in connection
with substance abuse treatment centers. Patient brokers are those who profit off of patients
seeking substance abuse treatment through “illicit referrals,” including “patient brokers who take
advantage of patients with opioid use disorders by referring these patients to substandard or
fraudulent providers in exchange for kickbacks.”154 The legislative intent was clear: Congress
included EKRA to the bill to crack down on individuals and companies taking advantage of and
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exploiting vulnerable patients seeking addiction treatment,155 as well as to close the gap left by
the Federal AKS.156
This provision is also significant because although there are similarities with the Federal
AKS, there are several defining distinctions. The Federal AKS already prohibits an individual to
knowingly and willfully provide anything of value in return for or to induce or reward referrals
of patients covered by federal health care programs. Rather than amend the Federal AKS, EKRA
creates a new, separate provision that makes remuneration illegal as to patients covered by
private health care plans as well.157 Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), one of three senators who
introduced this bill, noted that such kickbacks are already illegal under federal health care plans,
“but there is no Federal law to prohibit them in private health insurance plans.”158 She states,
“when people are struggling with addiction, their focus should be on getting well, not worrying
whether treatment facilities are trying to take advantage of them to make more money.”159 The
DOJ explained why EKRA’s expansion to people on private health insurance was needed:
“Patients in substance abuse treatment facilities are not usually Medicare beneficiaries, but often
people on private insurance, or often times people in their twenties, who are still on their parents’
plans.”160 Patients who are most vulnerable who are suffering from addiction and substance
abuse are essentially “treated as cash registers…”161 However, although EKRA is wellintentioned, the following subsection will discuss some of the limitations in the language of the
statute that have raised concerned for stakeholders as well as enforcers of act.
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b. Limitations to ERKA
First, the statute contains broad definitions that may cause discrepancies in enforcement.
EKRA defines “recovery home” as “a shared living environment that is, or purports to be, free
from alcohol and illicit drug use and centered on peer support and connection to services that
promote sustained recovery from substance use disorders.”162 “Clinical treatment facility” is
defined as “a medical setting, other than a hospital, that provides detoxification, risk reduction,
outpatient treatment and care, residential treatment, or rehabilitation for substance use, pursuant
to licensure or certification under state law.”163 “Laboratory” is defined to include all clinical
laboratories, and thus all referrals for clinical laboratory tests implicate EKRA regardless of
whether the tests relate to substance abuse testing or treatment.164
The definitions of “recovery home” and “clinical treatment facility” appear to lend
support to the legislative intent of the SUPPORT Act, however the broad definition of
“laboratories” does not, and may lead to unintended consequences in enforcement. Importantly,
EKRA does not define the term “referral.” “Because its prohibition against kickbacks is limited
to remuneration paid in exchange for referrals or an individual’s use of services, an authoritative
interpretation of the term ‘referral’ under EKRA is necessary to determine the scope of the
law.”165 Based on these definitions, EKRA establishes a new “public and private payor intentbased criminal anti-kickback law that prohibits any form of remuneration in exchange for
referrals to, or an individual’s use of, all entities that meet the definitions of recovery homes,
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clinical treatment facilities, and laboratories”– including referrals to laboratories unrelated to
substance abuse testing or treatment.166
Confusion in enforcement may start with the statutory interpretation of the term
“referral.” Under the AKS, although not defined, a referral, has been traditionally viewed to
apply to provider referrals. This is similar under EKRA, but it omits the statutory language that
the federal government has historically used under the AKS to apply that law to marketing and
sales activities.167 The lack of a definition for “referral” will likely cause the DOJ to come up
with regulation to clarify the meaning under EKRA so that it applies to marketing and sales
agents consistent with its legislative intent.168 EKRA’s broad statutory language in its prohibition
of remuneration in exchange for an individual using the services of a recovery home, clinical
treatment facility or lab is written that it may also apply to remuneration received by a patient for
his/her receipt of services by such an entity.169 This discrepancy may diverge from the Act’s
legislative intent as well.
Furthermore, under EKRA, many existing relationships in the healthcare industry will
need to be modified in order to comply with the statute and to avoid risk of criminal liability. In
the context of laboratories, EKRA’s broad language appears at first keen to prohibit laboratories
from paying commissions to an employed sales force, however to end commission-based
compensation for laboratory sales personnel would dramatically impact a common practice
among labs.170 It is common practice among laboratories to use employed sales representatives to
recommend or arrange for providers to purchase their services, and pay employees based on the
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volume or value of business they generate.171 Prior to EKRA, this practice was uncontroversial
because the AKS excepts, “any amount paid by an employer to an employee (bonafide
employment relationship) for employment in the provision of covered items or serviced.172
However, EKRA does not have a parallel exception and its broad definition of “laboratories”
does not limit these circumstances to drug-related testing.
Due to EKRA’s recent enactment only two years ago, there have not been many
convictions under this law for its impact to be determined yet. What is presumably the nation’s
first EKRA conviction occurred early January 2020 in Kentucky, when Theresa Merced admitted
in federal court that she solicited kickbacks from a toxicology laboratory in exchange for urine
drug testing referrals.173 Merced was the office manager of a substance abuse treatment clinic
and solicited kickbacks from the CEO of a toxicology lab in exchange for urine drug test
referrals.174 The 80-year-old woman is scheduled to be sentenced on May 1, 2020, and faces up
to 20 years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000.175
c. EKRA’s Effectiveness on Combatting the Opioid Crisis
The Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act seems to be well intended. It is Congress’s
attempt to address kickback schemes that fall short of the Federal AKS in connection with
patient brokering activities associated with substance abuse treatment and recovery efforts. It
provides the federal government another legal tool that can be used in prosecuting those who
exploit those suffering with addiction and drug abuse by referring them to insufficient or
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fraudulent providers in return for kickbacks.176 However, because of the law’s broadly drafted
definitions, there may be statutory consequences that exceed the initial legislative intent.177
While EKRA was in fact enacted to prohibit patient brokering of substance abuse patients on
behalf of substance abuse treatment providers and facilities, EKRA also applies to referrals to
laboratories unrelated to substance abuse treatment.178
It is important to note that although these definitions raise concerns for enforcement, its
expansion to prosecute actors who offer and receive kickbacks outside of the federal health care
setting is a step in the right direction in eliminating any gaps that existed under the Federal AKS.
However because of EKRA’s expansive reach to the private health industry, many existing
relationships in the health care industry will need to be modified to comply with the new law and
to avoid risk of criminal liability.179 The entire SUPPORT act is a wide-ranging provision that is
intended to add to the roster of tools intended to cure the opioid crisis.180 As more cases are
prosecuted by the DOJ under EKRA, its legal effectiveness as well as its deficiencies will be
determined.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has identified and discussed several legal tools that the federal government
uses to combat the over-prescription of drugs and the growing opioid crisis plaguing the United
States. The False Claims Act, although not designed to be an anti-fraud statute, has played a
critical role in prosecuting bad actors across the health care supply chain. The FCA creates
liability not just for those who submitted false claims, but also for those who “cause” false
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reimbursement claims to be made or “cause” false statements to be made in connection with
claims for reimbursement. Thus, the FCA is able to prosecute individual physicians filing false
claims to pharmaceutical companies who cause a doctor to file a false claim. With its qui tam
provision, also known as its whistleblower powers, the federal government can initiate
investigations as well as impose civil monetary penalties on bad actors. Because of the its treble
damages provision, some of the largest settlements under the FCA have been by pharmaceutical
manufacturers, like Pfizer and Insys Therapeutics Inc.181 Like many federal provisions, the FCA
has its limitations. For one, the government can only prosecute false claims involving the
defrauding of a federal health care program. Claims involving the private health insurances do
not fall under the realm of the FCA. As EKRA is to the AKS, it would be interesting to see an
amendment or legislative counterpart to the FCA that covers false claims as to private health
insurance business. Moreover, factually false claims, including claims for medical services never
provided certainly can increase unnecessary costs to federal health care programs. However, it
can be argued that these false claims do not contribute to the patient injury side of the opioid
crises because there were no patients actually prescribed the opioids.182 Despite this, the FCA is
viewed as one an important tool in combatting the opioid epidemic.183
The article then examines the effectiveness of the Controlled Substance Act in
combatting the opioid crisis. The CSA, which classifies both prescription and illicit drugs into
schedules based on its potential for abuse, imposes criminal penalties on those who illegally
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possess, distribute, manufacture or prescribe controlled substances without being a proper
registrant of the DEA. The CSA’s prosecutions are not limited to registrants under the DEA. The
CSA has been successful in the prosecutions of individual physicians and pharmacies who act as
drug dealers and pill mills through the over-prescription of opioids. The CSA is also seminal in
controlling the amount of controlled substances that may enter into the market. Manufacturers
and distributors who are in violation of the overproduction of opioids are successfully prosecuted
under the CSA. The threat of criminal penalties and the threat of losing DEA registrant status has
been key to deterring bad actors from violating the CSA and an efficient tool to combat the
opioid crisis.
The article then explores the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits the
remuneration of anything of value in return for the referral of patients or medical services. The
federal government uses the AKS as a tool to cut off opioid over-prescribing and over-referring
induced by remuneration. The AKS has been successful in prosecuting large pharmaceutical
companies and their executives, as well as individual doctors or pharmacies who accept
remuneration in return for their prescriptions. The AKS has been effective in combatting opioidrelated health care fraud, abuse and for protecting patients in cases in which a prescriber’s
medical judgement has been tainted by illegal kickbacks.184 Additionally, the AKS has been an
effective tool for purposes of prosecuting bad actors like Dr. Kenneth Sun185, whose opioid
prescriptions were fueled by greed. It must be noted that the AKS also has its limitations in their
application to federal (versus private) health care program business. Like the FCA, the federal
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AKS does not apply to patient recruiters who offers to pay for remunerations from private health
insurance business.186
Lastly, the article briefly explored the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018.
This act was incorporated in SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act. EKRA is designed to
focus on health care fraud (specifically kickbacks) in the context of opioids and crack down on
those bad actors who exploit patients struggling with addiction by referring them to insufficient
facilities or treatments in return for remunerations.187 Although this act does not prosecute bad
actors who put medically unnecessary opioids in the hands of more users, it combats those who
are exploiting drug addicts who are seeking help with their addiction. Importantly, EKRA fills in
the gaps left by the AKS by making remunerations illegal as to patients covered by private health
insurance. Because ERKA is relatively new, there have not been many cases surrounding the
legislation yet. However, as more cases arises, it will allow us to determine is effectiveness and
capability in the overall fight against the opioid crisis.
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